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Social Movements, Hegemony, and New Forms of Resistance
The history of subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic. There undoubtedly does exist a tendency to (at least in provisional stages) unification in the historical activity of these groups .... It therefore can only be demonstrated when an historical cycle is completed and this cycle culminates in a success.
-Antonio Grarnsci,Prison Notebooks
The emergence of new political and alternative movements despite their scant participation in [traditional] political life marks the start of a new way of conducting politics which responds to the legitimate demands of the marginalized majorities.
-Juan del Granda -39-acceptance of these doctrines was sold as a prerequisite for a, g Iden age fordemocracy and economic development patterned on the United States, and, as such was being held out to Latin America and much of the rest of the world as the model to follow, Yet, as the linked models of Western, capitalist style democratization and neoliberal economics have taken hold throughout the herni phcre, their uitability as a form of governance and viable economi system is being called into question, Throughout Latin America there is growing skcprici m that neoliberal economic policies will remedy the residual poverty and maldistribution of income and wealth that have plagued Latin America, I eferring to income distribution, Brazil, for instance, had a Gini coefficient of 0.59 at the end of the nineties, reflecting some of the greatest inequality in the world (Franko, 2003: 357) , Indeed, despite growth and macroeconomic stability during the nineties, no Latin American country experienced a decrease in income inequality, and many, including Argentina, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, saw income inequality increase (Franko, 2003: 355) , This pattern has continued in the years that followed, Worse yet, statistics from the World Bank indicate that economic performance was disastrous in 2002, with overall negative growth of 1.1% (Shifter, 2003: 52) , Even though economic growth has improved in 2003,2004, and 2005 , countries like Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador are still in severe crisis, Poverty is persistent throughout the region and has risen in many count:!:s, A large segment of the populatIon seems leri out of~at grow!linastaKen place, As the masses and segments of the middle classes have expressed their fr~stration, the last few years have seen popular uprislI1gs,ab~rted presidennal terms, economic chaos, attempted coups d'etat and the continued impoverishment of the masses if not segments of the middle class, ThIS In turn calls into question the legitimacy of the governments-if not the political system-and th bilit I '
, ,e a I y to govern, T ie progression of events suggests that there ISa reahgnment that is profound and that may well represent a radical change in polif in th ' , , , I res III t e region. Focusing on the last few decades, the economic slowdown during the "lost decade" of the 1980s combined with greater mobilization as political repression fell prey to the end of authoritarian rule and the expansion of democratization, to create a new political dynamic in many of the Latin American nations. Civil society became the locus of action and new forms of political action followed. The projection of an elitist armed vanguard as the spearhead of necessary change, began to fade in the face of unarmed political and social mobilizations. The assertion of popular power that had been seen in popular mobilizations like the pre-coup peasant leagues in Brazil's Northeast, began to bubble up in new and different forms. By the time neoliberal economic policybecame more widespread in the 1990s, there was a growing realization that the extant political systems in much of Latin America were proving unable to meet the needs of the vast majorities. Indeed, there is a growing consensus that the traditional politicians' political enterprise is leaving behind the great majorities, and effectively further marginalizing specific groups within those majorities. Such groups include indigenous people and peasants in southern Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia, rural laborers and the poor in Brazil, and those who live in the slums and who have been left out of the diffusion of oil wealth in Venezuela as well as large segments of the lower and middle classes in Argentina and Uruguay. Changing attitudes have often led to the abandonment of established political parties for new, more amorphous, ad hoc parties like Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement in Venezuela (MVR), or the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, to the upsurge of new political/social movements and mass organizations, and a plethora of national strikes, demonstrations, and protests As has been the case all too often in Latin America, the political systems have been unable to provide basic security in food, housing, education, employment, or monetary value and banking to wide sectors of the population. That is, large segments of the population have been marginalized from the nation project, and the governing institutions have been unwilling or unable to provide solutions for their situations. Indeed, in the eyes of most of the Latin American popular sectors, the structural adjustments and neoliberal reforms 44 Harry E. Vmldell representing the Washington Consensus (common positive perspective on neoliberal economic policies and liberal democratization shared by International financial institutions and the U.S. Government) have threatened their security and well being. The insecurity and dissatisfaction felt by the popular sectors and segments of the middle class thus dnve them to new forms of protest-to expand their repertoire of contentious actions as Sidney Tarrow (1998) might suggest-and to seek new and different political structures that might better respond to their needs. Old style parties and governments dominated by the elites are increasingly seen as unable to respond.
These current mobilizations seem to be different fro: opular uprisings ·tl;"Cpreceaeat1ieiil."""The systems of mass communication an re ated commUl11calton technology, and easy, low cost access to the internet have combined with higher levels of literacy, widened access to higher education and much greater political freedom under the democratization process (see UNDP, 1999: 3-9) . This has occurred when ideas of grassroots democracy, popular participation and even elements of liberation theology and Christian Base Community organization have been widely disseminated. However, unlike radical revolutionary movements of the last few decades, these new movements do not employ or advocate the radical, revolutionary restructuring of the state through violent revolution. Rather, their primary focus is to work within civil society, and push government and society to the limits to achieve n~eded and necessary change and restructuring. As the nineties progressed, dissatisfaction with traditional political leaders and traditional political parties became more widespread as did a growing trend to doubt the legitimacy of the political system itself, and calls for a return to democracy and honest government (see Vanden, 2004 
Bolivia
Events in Bolivia are illustrative. In October of 2003, U.S.-educated Bolivian President Gonzalo "Coni" Sanchez de Lozada was forced ant of office by massive displays of popular power by social movements, community organizations, unions and students. A staunch advocate of globalization and neoliberal policies prescribed by international financial institutions like the l.M.F. and World Bank, Sanchez de Lozada was also symbolic of the upper class Westernoriented political elites that have governed Latin America autocratically since the Spanish conquest in the early 1500s. His tormentors were equally symbolic of those the political class had long ruled and repressed. They were small farmers,indigenous peoples, miners, workers, students, and intellectuals who dared to challenge the status quo. Historically, the masses have been continually usurped by various political elites and rarely permitted to rule in their own right. This established a traditional pattern of rule and governance in the region that was more anthoritarian than democratic and always elitist. Rarely were the masses allowed to rule or decide policy on their own at the national level.Indeed, in Latin America people of popular extraction and of color have been few in the rarified halls of national government. (The example of Mexico's great national hero, Zapotec Indian Benito Juarez, is one of the notable exceptions.) And even when people of color or those from the popular sectors were in the governing circles, it remains to be seen how often they ruled in favor of the masses.
So it was all the more amazing that the departure of Sanchez de Lozada was effected by "los de abajo"-those on the bottom (see Azuela's classic novel, 2002). He had been forced from office by those who had most often been powerless in Bolivian history. The groups that converged on the BolIVlan capital of La Paz and other large cities were predominantly lower class, miners and agricultural workers and peasants, people who were mostly indigenous and the poor generally, Theirs was a struggle that had been gomg at least since the indigenoLls and peasant uprisings led by Tupac Amant and Tupac Katari in the 1780s, However, this time it was coordinated, effective, and most importantly, successful. Long before such national mobilization occurred, local communities often formed their own organizations to fight some aspect of colonial rule, exploitation or, more recently, globalization that was impacting them at the 1110St local level. This reaction can, for instance, be seen in the strong grassroots movement against the privatization of the public water supply in the mostly indigenous community of Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000, There, The Coordinating Committee to Defend Water and Life (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida), remained locally rooted (see Shultz, 2003: 34-37 ), Yet-unlike previous local actions-this struggle was always SantaCruz region and became an instrument of peasant mobilization there. As indigenous groups had met in congresses and assemblies-often termed "Assemblies to Take Sovereignty"-in the late eighties and early nineties they had reached the clear realization that they needed instruments to achieve political power. As their consciousness developed, they began to speak explicitly of the "Sovereignty of the People" and the need to create "Political Instruments for the Sovereignty of the People" (interviews, Yeteven in what might be termed one of Latin America's most organized societies(Ballve, 2005), the precipitating event was a U.S.-backed plan to sell Boliviannatural gas through a Chilean port that landlocked Bolivia had lost to its southern neighbor in the ill fated War of the Pacific (1879-1881). The disastrous failure of the neoliberal model that President Sanchez de Lozada had so strongly advocated added to the widely shared perception that this new trade dealWasbut one more ruse, to extract wealth from the nation and leave the indigenous masses even more poverty ridden and totally subject to the influence of OutSJdeforces (Rother, 2003) . Historically, most peasant and indigenous upnSlOgsand even many strikes by the tin miners had been characterized by their .n"-.~_ Globalization is just another name for submission and domination. We've had to live with that here for 500 years and now we want to be OUf own masters.
(N. Apaza, cited in Anti-TradeMessage,2003)
The Union of RuraLW<Jr.ker'-llJ)d the Cocaleros were soon joined by other socialj;QIDTI..ruJ:s, urban unions, and students as they mobilized in massive de~onstrations in La Paz and at er cities, The government futilely tried to repress the demonstrators, causing the loss of 80 lives. This enraged the opposition even more and increased the president's isolation. Meeting in their villages and union headquarters many more decided to join the uprising. Bolivian miners and others across the country also joined the protests and decided to march on the capital. As his political backers dropped away in the face of the mass mobilization Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign and leave the country.
By the beginniQg of 2005 there was a growing popular erce lion that thẽ ntial fights of the peo..l'k..~[Lnot being onore y the successor governmerjt of Carlos Mesa and that tht natural gas reserves-symbolic otnational patrimony-were once a ain bein looted b forei n interests. This occasioned popular mobilizations by the same popular movements that had driven Sanchez de Lozada from office. Indeed, as the government of former vice president Mesa was beset by similar massive mobilizations in May and June of 2005, the extent of the political power of the mobilized masses once agam became manifest. With Eva Morales and his MAS party taking a prominent leadership position the co liti f .
• 'l a 1 Ion 0 new social movements and labor unions pushed even.ha:der. They were unwilling to allow the president of the senate-as the next mime c tituti I' r e natlOnallegi I t legislato-, who were from th sa ure were necessary to get more e common people and were linked to their interSocial Movements, Hegemony, and New Forms of Resistance 49 ests. Only when these conditions were met and the President of the Supreme Court assumed power until new elections could he held, did MAS and the mobilized movements accept a settlement. This ongoing struggle culminated in the formation of a new government after elections were held in which Evo Morales was elected with an outright majority in the first round of voting.
This represented a substantial change in politics, as the mayor of La Paz observed in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. Indeed, these events seemed to well represent the unification of subaltern groups and culmination of an historic cycle that Gramsci foresaw in the quote that opens this chapter. The new social movements in Bolivia had been able to take politics out of lbẽ id~n.tiaLp.alakUljLd-h.ill1s of congress where elitist politics and the..traditionaLpolitil;al.l;L<l& dominated and jntn their space the villages, neigh-Q.Qrhn.Qds~l2oRularcouncils0!nd the streets and rural highway.s.J:hat_ co_uJ.d..mIll!2!: They had taken the initiative themselves and had been able to forge a broad, national coalition that cemented the two presidents' downfall and established the viability of their social movements as key political actors whose demands had to be heeded. Uulike Ecuador in 2000 and the Bolivian revolution of 1952, they had done so without seizing power themselves, but had demonstrated just how effectively they could use and mobilize massive political power on a national scale. They had done so from below, through a broad coalition of social movements with strong identities and deep, democratic ties to their constituencies. They had initiated a form of participatory governance that would radically alter decision making practices in their Andean nation and that suggested that government must indeed serve the people if it was to endure. Morales and hi ent Toward Socialism (MAS) were able to ride this lY.!lY.e..o£.protest-anrl.mD.bilization as he was elected as the irst . g~-idenLoLB.Q.Qvjaand MAS secured substantial representation in the nation 'I l,gislaturtil2 of 27 in the Senate and 73 of 130 in the Chamber of DepuThs) in the new elections of December 2005. Indeed, Morales seems to have well captured the dynamic essence of the combined movements that brought him to power. As he said in his inaugural address on January 22, 2006, Brazil and the Movement of Landless Rural Workers, the MST P.oliticsJxLllrazil have also been altered b the insertion of the largest Latin American social movement mia the national olitical arena. T e oviment;d~s Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terral wasfnnne a response to ongst~g, economic, social and political conditions in Brazil. Lan ) wealth and power were allocated in very unequal ways in Brazil since the conquest in the early 1500s, Land has remained highly concentrated and as late as 1996, 1% of the landowners owned 45% of the land (Petras, 2000: 35) . Conversely, as of 2001 there were some 4.5 million landless rural workers in Brazil, Wealth has remained equally concentrated. In 2001 the Brazilian Institute of Government Statistics reported that the upper 10% of the population averaged an income that was nineteen times greater than the lowest 40% (Brazilian Institute of Statistics, 2001 ). The plantation agriculture that dominated the colonial period and the early republic became the standard for Brazilian society. Ibẽ \t]l few owned the land, reaped the profits, and decided the political destiny of the many. Slavery was the institution that provided most 0 the Ia or on the early plantation system and thus set the nature of the relationship between the wealthy landowning elite and the disenfranchised toiling masses who labored in the fields. Land has stayed in relatively few hands in Brazil, and the agricultural laborers continued to be poorly paid and poorly treated. Further, after the commercialization and mechanization of agriculture that began in the 1970s, much of the existing rural labor force became superfluous. As this process continued and became more tightly linked to the increasing globalization of production, not only were rural laborers let go, sharecroppers were expelled from the land they had farmed and small farmers lost their land to larger family or commercial estates. This resulted in growing ruraJ unemployment and the growth of rural landless families with few prospects. Many were forced to rmgrate to the iti II h ' CIies to swe t e numbers of the urban POOt while others opted for the go 1 vernment sponsored Amazon colonization program w iereby they were tran t d h
spar e to t e Amazon region to cut down the Iamtorest and begin to cult' t he land and the poor 'I f th elVa e t e an . Few found decent jobs in the city ---.-_--------------IIIII Their political culture and decision making processes br~ak from the authoritarian tradition and are subversive of the dominant political culture, The movement has been heavily influenced by Liberation Theology and the participatory democratic culture that is generated by the use and study of Paulo Freire's approach to self-taught, critical education, Indeed, the strongly participatory nature of the organization and the collective nature of leadership and decision making have made for a dynamic new democratic, participatory political culture that challenges traditional authoritarian notions and vertical decision making structures (see MST, 2000, and Rodrigues Brandao, 200l) , One.of the characteristics of new social movements llke the MST is their broad national vision, Thus the Landless envision a thoroughgoing land reform and complete ;:;'structuring of agrarian production in all of Brazil. The MST believes that is impossible to develop the nation, to construct a democratic society or eliminate poverty or social inequality in the countryside without eliminating the latifundio, But they go on to say that agrarian reform is only viable if it is part of a popular project that would transform Brazil's economic and social structures (MST, 2000) , L.lk!:nra 'tical movements in Latin America, the Se", !.rilllLJx.e-.w.elLaware of how their struggle is linked to international coThus they begin by challenging the positive vision of neoliberaliSm presented by the globalized media and the attempt at hegemonic control that It exercises. In a draft document on the "Fundamental Principles for the SoCIa!and Economic Transformation of Rural Brazil;' they note that "the political unity of the Brazilian dominant classes under Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) This type of national organization had not been the case in prior local or regional movements. Previously, identity was much more locally rooted. N, had been the case in other Latin American countries, traditional elite dominated politics and bourgeois political parties had proven unable and unwilling to address the deteriorating economic conditions of the marginalized groups who were suffering the negative effects of economic globalization. The response by the new movements was grassroots organization and the development of a new repertoire of actions that broke with old forms of political activity. Developing organization and group actions began to tie individual members together in a strongly forged group identity. They were sometimes assisted in this task by progressive organizations concerned with economic and social justice. In the case of Brazil and the Landless, this role was played by the Lutheran church and especially the Pastoral Land Commission of the Catholic Church. Although these organizations assisted the Landless as did some segments of the Workers Party (PT), the organization never lost its autonomy. It was decided from the onset that this was to be an organization for the Landless Workers tha t would be run by the Landless Workers for their benefit as they defined it. They engaged in direct actions such as land takeovers from large estates and public lands, the construction of black plastic covered encampments along the side of the road to call attention to their demands for land, and marches and confrontations when necessary. They even occupied the family farm of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso shortly before the 2002 election to draw attention to his landowning interests and the consequent bias they attributed to him. They were at times brutally repressed, assassinated and imprisoned, but they persevered, forcing land distribution to their people and others without land. Their ability to mobilize as many as 12,000 people for a single land takeover or 100,000 for a national march suggested just how strong their organizational abilities were and how well they could communicate and coordinate at the national level. They also created a great deal of national support and helped to create a national consensus that there was a national problem with land distribution and that some substantial reform was necessary.
The L e been well attuned to the international globalization illllgg~sider themselves part a It, e 111 to orgamze and articipating in the Wnrld Social Forums in Porto Alegre and sending t eir reE[esentatives to demonstrations and protests throughout the world. Indeed, at least one recent work suggests that this was part of a developing global backlash against economic globalization (see Broad, 2002) . Struggles that were once local and isolated are now international and linked (see della Porta and Tarrow, 2005) . The news media and growing international communications links like cellular phones and especially electronic mail greatly facilitated the globalization of struggle and the globalization of awareness of local struggles and support and solidarity for them. This and the dramatic actions like massive land takeovers by the MST also generated considerable support at the nationallevel and international level and help to define what might be considered a local problem as a national problem that requires national attention and national resources to remedy it.
The interaction between the MST and the Workers Par PT is also instructive. Although re ations etween t e two organizations are generally excellent at the local level,with overlapping affiliations, the nationalleaderships have remained separate and not always as cordial. The MST has maintained a militant line in regard to the need to take over unused Ia.nd and assert their agenda, whereas much of the PT leadership has wanted to be more conciliatory. Thus the Landless backed and supported Lula (Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva) and the Workers Party in most local campaigns and the national campaigns for the presidency. In this way they helped to achieve significant regime change in Brazil, where Lula was elected with 61.27% of the vote in the second round of voting in 2002. Indeed, realizing the PI's historic challenge to neoliberal policies and elitist rule, the Landless turned out heavily in the election to join some 80% of the registered voters who participated in the voting in both rounds. Once the election was over, the Landless did not press to be part of the government. Rather, they continued to press the government for a comprehensive land reform program and a redistribution of the land and wealth. There would be no return to politics as usual. The PT would press its "0 Hunger" program and other ameliorative social and economic initiatives and the MST would press the PT government for the structural reform.s (e.g., comprehensive agrarian reform and economic restructuring)
that It considered necessary Ind d th! , , ,
